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___________________________________________________ 
 
Explanation, prediction, causation  ? an unholy trinity? 
Appreciative comments on Philosophy and  
Methods in Political Science 
 
Colin Hay, Sciences Po, Paris 
_________________ 
 
 
Abstract: In this short ďƵƚ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ <ĞŝƚŚ ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ƐĞŵŝŶĂů Philosophy and 
Methods in Political Science I reflect on the distinctive treatment of both realism and explanation 
in contemporary political science that its author offers, expressing rather more sympathy for the 
ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?  /ǁĞůĐŽŵĞ ŚŝƐ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ĂŶĚŵŝƐƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ?ŝƐŵƐ ? ŝŶŵƵĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞ
existing literature, whilst pointing to some potential inconsistencies; I accept his broad and 
inclusive understanding of philosophic realism; and I praise Dowding for putting the question of 
explanation  W and its adequacy  W at the heart of the philosophy of political science (where I think 
it belongs).  Yet I reject the idea that prediction is or, indeed, should be central to all social 
scientific explanation.  Similarly I take issue with the contention that we are typically distracted 
ďǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ?ĐƌĞĚŝďůǇĐĂƵƐĂů ?ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŚĞ
crux of adjudicating good from bad explanation.  I explore the implications of such a position and 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞǁŝƚŚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŽĨĚĂƚĂ ? 
 
 
<ĞŝƚŚ ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐPhilosophy and Methods in Political Science is a most important 
book which is surely destined to become something of a classic of contemporary 
political analysis.  Like the very best texts, it is important both as an intervention in 
the debate in its own right and as an accessible and penetrating guide through the 
complexities of that debate for students encountering them for the first time.  Yet, in 
one sense it is a difficult book to recommend to students  W for it provides them with 
all the ammunition they need to ask irritatingly taxing questions of people like 
myself.  But that, of course, is a very good thing.   
 
The text is closely, even forensically, argued and it warrants close reading  W the kind 
of reading on which its own incisiveness is undoubtedly predicated.  There is a great 
deal in it and, partly due to its structure and style of presentation it can, at times, 
appear a little aphoristic.  It contains, I am absolutely convinced, a distinctive, 
coherent and internally consistent perspective (that of its author); but it is not 
always set out in such a way as to make that easy to discern.  For it is written not so 
much through the stepwise unfolding and exposition of that perspective so much as 
through a series of specific interventions (no doubt informed by that perspective) in 
debates chosen for their pedagogic import.  Whilst, in a textbook, that is almost 
certainly the correct choice, it does make it is all the more difficult to engage with it 
as a holistic perspective in its own right.   
 
dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ? ƚŚĞŶ ? ŵƵĐŚ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐPhilosophy and Methods in Political 
Science and, given its extraordinary reach ĂŶĚ ƌĂŶŐĞ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
characteristically acerbic precision, something to frustrate and irritate almost 
everyone.  Yet, strangely perhaps, certainly given the positions we are typically 
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assigned at opposite ends of the political analytic spectrum in debates of this kind, 
there is rather less to frustrate and irritate me than I was perhaps anticipating.  In 
the end, it seems, whilst doing our political science rather differently, we agree on 
much more of the philosophy of political science than others tend to assume.  For 
me at least, there is something rather reassuring about that.   
 
The task assigned me in this symposium is to reflect on realism and explanation in 
ƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĞĂĐŚŝŶ Philosophy and 
Methods in Political Science.  To be honest, I am much happier reflecting about the 
latter than the former, not least since I think we should all be talking about 
explanation rather more  W ĂŶĚ ? ĨŽƌ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌƚŚ ? ƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ůĞƐƐ ?  / ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚ
Dowding would agree.   
 
Indeed, I now tend to resist talking about realism at all ... having been told, variously, 
that I am not and never have been a realist, that I was a realist but have strayed, that 
when I was a realist I was not the right kind of realist, and that I have committed any 
ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƌĞĂůŝƐƚ ƐŝŶƐ  ?ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌƐƚ ? ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ? ďĞŝŶŐ  ?ĂĐƚƵĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ?  DŽƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ
comments came at a time in my career when, rightly or wrongly, I did think of what I 
was doing as realist, even if distinctively and quirkily so.  But, suitably chastened, I 
have long since desisted from using realism are a general badge of self-identification.  
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐďŽŽŬŵĂŬĞƐŵĞƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƉƌĞŵĂƚƵƌĞ ? 
 
Part of the reason for this is that, quite simply, I agree with much of what Dowding 
ŚĂƐƚŽƐĂǇĂďŽƵƚƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ?ŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĐĂǀĞĂƚƐĂďŽƵƚ ?ŝƐŵƐ ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŶĚ/
find that the position I myself hold falls fairly squarely within the (broad) realm of 
positions he describes as realist.   
 
KŶ ?ŝƐŵƐ ? ?ůŝŬĞƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ?
 
There is a tendency in debates of the kind assembled in this symposium, in which the 
merits of a particularly significant intervention are debated, to register and signal 
ŽŶůǇŽŶĞ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚƐ of disagreement.  Here I want to depart from that tradition.  For I 
think the points of agreement are at least as important.   
 
/ǁŝůůƐƚĂƌƚǁŝƚŚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŶŽƚŽĨƌĞĂůŝƐŵƉĞƌƐĞďƵƚŽĨ  ?ŝƐŵƐ ?
more generally.  Here I agree with the majority of what he has to say, with just a 
ĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨŵŝŶŽƌĐĂǀĞĂƚƐ ?   ?/ƐŵƐ ?ĂƌĞ ? ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ŶŽŵŽƌĞƐŽƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ
textbooks.  They do, indeed, (or can, at least) encourage sloppy thinking and they are 
 W or invariably lead to  W overly stylised generalisations.  They are, in short, dangerous 
and distorting simplifications.   
 
Yet, accepting all of these points, there is a certain inconsistency here.  This 
manifests itself as a strange kind of performative contradiction, both in the chapter 
ŽŶ  ?ŝƐŵƐ ? ŝƚƐĞůĨĂŶĚ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ? ŝŶƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚ ĨŽůůŽǁ ?  /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ
are possibly two problems here.  First, overly stylised generalisations are the very 
stuff of modern political science, whether that science proceeds inductively or 
deductively.  We work with them all the time.  Dowding, hardly averse to a 
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simplifying generalisation in the right place, is well aware of this.  The point is that 
the need for them and the use we make of them (with, of course, some cautionary 
qualifications) is something which is otherwise defended by Dowding in this book.  
Accordingly, it seems a little unbalanced to launch such a coruscating broadside 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ  ?ŝƐŵƐ ?ĂƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐŝŶŐĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ŝŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŽĨ ƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚǁŚĞŶŽƚŚĞƌ
simplifying generalisations (like, say, the assumption of self-interest or of 
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĂƐƐĂŝůĞĚ ŝŶ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ?  ^ŽŵĞ  ?ƵƐĞĨƵů ƐŚŽƌƚ-
ŚĂŶĚƐ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐĂƌĞƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞĚǁŚŝůƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ?WƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůǇ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĞǀĞŶ
appropriately, in a text on the philosophy of political science it is philosophical 
ƐŚŽƌƚĐƵƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚ ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ŝƌĞ ǁŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƐ  ?ƚŚĞ
assumption of self-interest and so forth) are given a far easier ride.  But the 
inconsistency remains  W and it jars, just a little.   
 
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŝŶĨĂĐƚĂƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŬŝŶĚŽĨĐĂƉŝƚƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ?ŝƐŵƐ ?
ĂŶĚ  ?ŝƐŵŝĐ ? ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ?  dŚƵƐ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ǁŚĞƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉĞƚŝƚĞ ĨŽƌ Ă  ?ƉŽƐƚ-ŝƐŵŝĐ ? ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ  ?ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚƐƵďƐƚantive 
chapter of the book, no less), what follows is a (presumably) reluctant and (of 
course) unusually sophisticated and sensitive reworking of a quite familiar and 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?ŝƐŵƐ ?ĂƐĂƉƌĞůƵĚĞƚŽĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĐŽƵĐŚĞĚůĂƌŐĞůǇ
in ƚŚĞŝƌ ƚĞƌŵƐ ?  tŚĂƚ ǁĞ ŵŝƐƐ ŝƐ ĂŶǇ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ Ă  ?ƉŽƐƚ-ŝƐŵŝĐ ?  ?ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ŝƐ
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐĂŵĞŝƐƐƵĞƐǁŽƵůĚůŽŽŬůŝŬĞ ?ŶŽƌĞǀĞŶĂƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĂďůĞ ?/Ĩ ?ĂƐŽŶĞŵŝŐŚƚǁĞůůƐƵƌŵŝƐĞĨƌŽŵŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
reluctant ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽ ?ŝƐŵƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ
ƚŚĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ Ă  ?ŝƐŵŝĐ ?
ƚǇƉĞ ?ƚŚĞŶĂƚŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞĚĞƐĞƌǀĞĂĨƵůůĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨ ?ƉŽƐƚ-ŝƐŵŝĐ ?
reflection and their implications.  In the absence of this I remain enticed by the 
prospect of a post-ismic philosophy of the social sciences and just a little 
disappointed that the intriguing suggestion that such a thing might be possible (and 
the hunch that it might be desirable) are left largely unexplored.  
 
dŚĂƚƐĂŝĚ ?ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ?ŝƐŵŝĐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŝƐǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚ W not 
least on the subject of realism (in and through the reflection on which much of it is 
couched).  His argument, in short, is that a lot more of us are realists than most self-
professed realists of the tub-thumping variety (we can all think of a few) would be 
prepared to concede.  If realism is the view that there is a world that exists 
independently of us or, as I would prefer, the view that there is a world that, at any 
given moment in time, exists independently of us, then we are all realists  W or almost 
all of us.  Some of us, of course, would want to emphasise that the subjects of social 
scientific analysis are so intimately embedded within this world that our 
independence from it dissolves the moment our reflections extend over any period 
of time  W in that we shape through even our most trivial and least conscious of acts 
that world in ways that, as social scientists, should interest us (Hay 2016).  But the 
point is that, for Dowding, that it an internal debate amongst realists.  And I suspect 
the argument itself is no longer especially controversial; though, interestingly, it is 
the effective point of departure of ĞƌŐĞƌĂŶĚ>ƵĐŬŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ^ĞĂƌůĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐŵƐ ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐŽŶůǇƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŽƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ Wrealism is 
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rather more universal and rather less discriminating a label than its most vociferous 
prophets tend to presume. 
 
I will leave my reflections on realism there in order to turn to what I regard to be 
more important questions  W questions which, in a sense, are more clearly and 
obviously post-ismic.  
 
Explanation, prediction, causation  ? an unholy trinity? 
 
These relate to explanation and causation  W and to the link that Dowding seeks to 
establish between these two terms and that of prediction.  Again, I will try to keep 
my reflections brief.  But a number of points might here be made.   
 
First, this is precisely the right set of issues.  Political analysts do not, in general, 
reflect nearly enough on what they mean by explanation  W and, partly as a 
consequence, we tend not to encourage our students to do so either.  That is, quite 
simply, not good enough; and Dowding shows us why.   
 
Once again, then, I want to start by underscoring a note of agreement.  I, too, would 
now want to place the question of explanation (what makes for an explanation and 
what makes for a good explanation) at the heart of the philosophy of political 
analǇƐŝƐ ?ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐďŽŽŬƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐŵǇĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚ ?/ƚŚĂƐƐƚƌƵĐŬŵĞ
for a long time that a great number of (unresolved) disputes in political science 
actually boil down to the largely unacknowledged and unasked question of what 
might be seen to constitute an adequate explanation of a given set of outcomes.  We 
need to acknowledge that we can have, do have, and are right to have different 
views on that question and to begin to reflect on why that might be so.  This book 
helps. 
 
But the issue of prediction, which Dowding wants to place at centre stage in such 
debates, I think gets in the way here (or perhaps it is just indicative of one of the key 
rifts in political analysis around this question).  The idea that all explanation is 
ultimately about the fashioning of predictions, I find, strangely misplaced.  That said, 
I can certainly see where it comes from and also how it comes, in effect, to save as 
 ?ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůŵŽĚĞůƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌƚǇƉŝĐĂůƐtock-
in-trade) that (despite their utility) I would not regard as explanatory per se.  Why do 
I not regard them as explanatory?  Because they are not credibly causal even in their 
own terms.  They are slightly more credibly predictive, but only slightly (a point to 
which we return presently).   
 
But even before we get to that I think it is first important to acknowledge, and then 
to deal with, the suggestion that not all explanation is causal.  This, too, I find 
problematic.  The claim is made a number of times (see, for instance, 2016: 6-7, 42, 
57-60, 133).  But it is never really defended in any detail.  Dowding suggests that we 
might differentiate (inter alia) between causal, functional and interpretive 
explanation.  Yet I remain unconvinced.  For me, interpretive explanation, where it is 
genuinely explanatory, is causal and makes a causal claim (however unconventional 
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that claim might seem).  Similarly, functional explanation  W which, for me is nearly 
always bogus in the social sciences  W in the end rests on a causal claim, too, if it is to 
be regarded as genuinely explanatory.  Whether it should be regarded as 
explanatory is another matter; but here, again, I would suggest the question of 
credible causality returns.  A putative functional claim is, or might be deemed, 
explanatory to the extent to which it offers (or is deemed to offer) an account that is 
credibly causal.   
 
In stark contrast, for Dowding, the demonstration of causality is in fact something of 
a sideshow, with far too much time spent (presumably, wasted) by political analysts 
on this unnecessary endeavour (2016: 6).  Reading between the lines, any theory or 
model is deemed by him explanatory if it generates or is capable of generating an 
expectation  W a hypothesis, in effect.  Explanation, in this sense, is about aligning the 
expectation (the hypothesis) with the evidence (whether deterministically or, more 
frequently, probabilistically).   
 
On the face of it, this might seem fine.  But I think we need to be very careful here.  
For it is perfectly possible, I would contend, to be predictive in this seen (i.e.: to 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ĂŶ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ĞǀŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞ  ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?
(typically, of course, in political science a retrospective one) is born out by the 
evidence (or, at least, seen to be so).  
 
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽŝŶƚ  Wand here I do agree  W is that we are interested in 
explaining things (social and political facts) in and through our stake (instrumental or 
otherwise) in them.  In other words, we explain in order to give us a more informed 
perspective on how we might intervene to produce better outcomes in the future 
(our interest is prospective).  That is fine.  But one can be prospectively oriented in 
this way without claiming for oneself the power to be predictive.  To do so is not so 
much to be predictive as it is to acknowledge the limits on our capacity to predict 
and to act in due recognition of those limits.  The notion of prediction (which might 
be neutral in the natural sciences) here generates the wrong  W indeed, an 
illegitimate  W expectation. 
 
DŽƌĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ Ɛƚŝůů ? ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞǆƉůĂŶƚŝŽŶ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƚŚĞ
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĨƵƌŶŝƐŚĂ ?ĐƌĞĚŝďůĞ ?ĐĂƵƐĂůƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŶĚ this is my real problem.  For I would 
argue that, in order to be seen as genuinely explanatory, an account needs to be 
credibly causal.  Constant conjunction in the Humean sense, then, is inadequate on 
this understanding unless and until the constant conjunction is linked to a causal 
story or narrative that is genuinely offered (in the sense that the causal sequence 
described could genuinely have produced the outcome and the author genuinely 
believes that it did).  The question then becomes what kind(s) of putatively 
explanatory stories are credibly causal.  And this, I think, is where our two 
approaches really do part company.   
 
Where we differ, above all and as already hinted at, is on formal models as causal  W 
and, indeed, on formal models as explanatory and perhaps, even, on formal models 
as predictive.  Put bluntly, I do not see formal models as causal and because of this I 
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do not see them as explanatory.  They fail, in other words, to be explanatory 
ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƉĂƐƐ ƚŚĞ  ?ĐƌĞĚŝďůĞ ĐĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚĞƐƚ  Wand, because of 
that, they are not a valid basis for prediction.  Why?  Because, quite simply, their 
authors (the model-builders) typically do not believe the assumptions on which the 
models they build are predicated  W with some even going so far as to defend the 
implausibility of their assumptions as a condition of the interest and utility of their 
model world (most famously, Friedman 1953).  For me, if the assumptions are 
demonstrably false or self-confessedly unrealistic then the model cannot credibly 
explain the outcome.  As such, the outcome is not genuinely predicted nor, as a 
consequence, is the account to which it gives rise genuinely causal or genuinely 
explanatory.  The model-builder here is a little like the oracle who believes that she 
has lost her powers of divination and no longer has privileged access to the thoughts 
of the relevant deities but carries on making her prophecies anyway.  The trouble is 
that others carry on heeding her advice as if it were genuinely offered.   
 
The capacity to build a model on the basis of formal stylised assumptions (about 
human conduct, for instance), that is capable of generating an expectation born out 
by the facts (whether prospectively or, more likely retrospectively) is no mean feet.  
That achievement should certainly not be sniffed at  W and the model itself is likely to 
have some considerable analytic and heuristic value (see also Hay 2004).  But  W and it 
is a big but  W such a model cannot and should not be regarded as explanatory if the 
assumptions on which it is built are acknowledged to be false (or even just 
implausible).  For if those assumptions are wrong (or, indeed, just extremely fallible) 
and acknowledged as such, the model-builder cannot genuinely claim that the 
process or mechanism that the model describes could credibly exist such that it 
might generate the anticipated outcome.  Whatever else the achievement, it is not 
explanatory because the model to which it gives rise is not credibly causal.   
 
The irony is that it is precisely because we seek to explain in order to improve the 
social and political conditions that pertain in the world in which we live (as Dowding 
would have it) that we cannot be so generous and undiscriminating in our views of 
explanatory adequacy.  To explain an outcome, quite simply, has to be to tell a story 
that could credibly have produced the outcome.  That, of course, is the one type of 
story that a formal model cannot offer.  And, for me, that is sufficient to establish 
that such models, whatever their analytic value, are not explanatory.   
 
Reproducibility and transparency 
 
In lieu of a more conventional conclusion, I wish to use the opportunity of this 
symposium to draw attention to the short passage in the book with which I have 
perhaps the greatest difficulty.  It is completely unrelated to the previous discussion 
 W ĂŶĚ ?ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬĂůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞŽĨŚŝƐďƌŽĂĚĞƌ
philosophy of political science.   
 
This relates to the question of research transparency and reproducibility (2016: 166-
9).  Here Dowding echoes the recent calls in certain parts of the discipline for all of 
the data and coding frames used in empirical research to be made fully transparent 
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and available (through open access) to the wider research community and the public 
more generally.   
 
This, I think, we should reject.  The argument is simple and is perhaps best put in 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ƚĞƌŵƐ ?  tŚĞŶ / ƌĞĂĚ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ <ĞŝƚŚ ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ? / ǁĂŶƚ ƚŽ
read his analysis and his interpretation of the data he collects and interrogates.  I am 
not terribly interested in having full access to his data, his coding book and the 
means he uses to makes the inferences he draws from that data.  What I want to 
read is his interpretation and, above all, the argument he makes on the basis of that 
interpretation.  It is that argument that I want to understand and to engage with.  I 
am happy to trust him, as much as I trust anyone, to collect and process the data 
appropriately and for peer review to take care of that part of things.  In short, I want 
to read him, not what someone trying to behave like him might write and think were 
they to try to replicate his research using his data and his code book.   
 
Transparency and reproducibility sound like unimpeachable virtues; but they are no 
substitute for insight; their fetishisation downplays the role of interpretation in the 
generation of that insight, and the manifesto to which they have given rise is based 
on unsubstantiated fears of duplicity and mistrust.  We need to be very careful what 
we wish for.  As I am sure Keith Dowding would agree, political science cannot be 
conducted by robots; I wish that some of our colleagues would stop trying to 
pretend that it can or that things would be better if it were.   
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